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By Carol A. Corrigan*
The first, best, and most effective shield against injustice for an indi-
vidual accused, or society in general, must be found not in the persons of
defense counsel, trial judge, or appellate jurist, but in the integrity of the
prosecutor. Some readers may view this concept with skepticism. Yet
this notion lies at the heart of our criminal justice system and is the foun-
dation from which any prosecutor's authority flows.
I. The Prosecutor's Function
The prosecutor occupies a unique role in a legal system predicated
generally on individual representation. The prosecutor does not repre-
sent the victim of a crime, the police, or any individual.' Instead, the
prosecutor represents society as a whole. His goal is truth and the
* B.A., 1970, Holy Names College; J.D., 1975, University of California, Hastings College
of the Law. Currently, a Senior Deputy District Attorney in Alameda County, California, Ms.
Corrigan is also an adjunct professor of law at Hastings College of Law and the University of
California at Berkeley. She served as a member of the President's Commission on Organized
Crime and a consultant and staff editor for the President's Task Force on Victims of Crime.
She has taught for the National College of District Attorneys, the California District Attor-
neys Association, the Alaska Department of Law, the Prosecutors of the State of Hawaii,
Hastings College of Advocacy and the National Institute of Trial Advocacy.
1. "A prosecutor represents the People of the State of California, not the police and not
the victim(s) involved in any particular case except insofar as they are included among the
People." ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CALIFORNIA PROSECUTOR 2, Commentary
to Chapter 1, Section I (California District Attorneys Ass'n 1985) (emphasis in original).
"Witnesses for the prosecution, including the victim himself are not parties to a criminal
prosecution and the action is not brought in their interests as individuals or on their behalf.
Thus the relationship between them and the district attorney is not that of attorney and cli-
ent." People v. Municipal Court (Pellegrino), 27 Cal. App. 3d 193, 207, 103 Cal. Rptr. 645,
655 (1972); see also NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS 418 (Nat'l District Attorneys
Ass'n 1977); UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS 2, (California District Attorneys Ass'n
1974); UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING MANUAL (California District Attorneys Ass'n 1974).
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achievement of a just result.2 The distinction between the roles of com-
peting advocates in a criminal case was articulated by Justice White,
joined by Justices Harlan and Stewart in their concurring and dissenting
opinion in United States v. Wade:
Law enforcement officers have the obligation to convict the guilty
and to make sure they do not convict the innocent. They must be
dedicated to making the criminal trial a procedure for the ascer-
tainment of the true facts surrounding the commission of the
crime. To this extent, our so-called adversary system is not adver-
sary at all; nor should it be. But defense counsel has no compara-
ble obligation to ascertain or present the truth. Our system assigns
him a different mission. He must be and is interested in preventing
the conviction of the innocent, but, absent a voluntary plea of
guilty, we also insist that he defend his client whether he is inno-
cent or guilty. The State has the obligation to present the evidence.
Defense counsel need present nothing, even if he knows what the
truth is. He need not furnish any witnesses to the police, or reveal
any confidences of his client, or furnish any other information to
help the prosecution's case. If he can confuse a witness, even a
truthful one, or make him appear at a disadvantage, unsure or in-
decisive, that will be his normal course. Our interest in not con-
victing the innocent permits counsel to put the State to its proof, to
put the State's case in the worst possible light, regardless of what
he thinks or knows to be the truth. Undoubtedly there are some
limits which defense counsel must observe but more often than not,
defense counsel will cross-examine a prosecution witness, and im-
peach him if he can, even if he thinks the witness is telling the
truth, just as he will attempt to destroy a witness who he thinks is
lying. In this respect, as part of our modified adversary system and
as part of the duty imposed on the most honorable defense counsel,
we countenance or require conduct which in many instances has
little, if any, relation to the search for truth.3
The difference in our roles as advocates derives from the degree of
our authority and the disparity of our obligations. Defense counsel's le-
gitimate and necessary goal is to achieve the best possible result for his
client. His loyalty is to the individual client alone. The prosecutor, how-
ever, enters a courtroom to speak for the People4 and not just some of the
People. The prosecutor speaks not solely for the victim, or the police, or
those who support them, but for all the People. That body of "The Peo-
2. Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935); People v. Superior Court (Greer), 19
Cal. 3d 255, 266, 561 P.2d 1164, 1171, 137 Cal. Rptr. 476, 483 (1977): In re Ferguson, 5 Cal.
3d 525, 531, 487 P.2d 1234, 1238, 96 Cal. Rptr. 594, 598 (1971).
3. 388 U.S. 218, 256-58 (1967).
4. "The style of all process shall be 'The People of the State of California' and all prose-
cutions shall be conducted in their name and by their authority." CAL. GOV'T CODE § 100(b)
(West 1980).
ple" includes the defendant and his family and those who care about
him. It also includes the vast majority .of citizens who know nothing
about a particular case, but who give over to the prosecutor the authority
to seek a just result in their name.
II. Critical Case Evaluation
Practically every prosecutor has at some time had to field a question
like this one: "Your job must be interesting and it must be rewarding to
convict a guilty person. But isn't it hard to prosecute somebody when
you aren't sure he did it?" The answer is that no prosecutor should ever
be in that position. No prosecutor should charge or handle a case at any
stage of its progress through the system unless he is personally satisfied
that the defendant is guilty. The California District Attorney's Associa-
tion has adopted an extensive set of technical and operational standards
relating to the exercise of the prosecutorial function.5 Among these
guidelines are the Uniform Crime Charging Standards which provide:
The prosecutor should charge only if the following four basic
requirements are satisfied:
a. The prosecutor, based on a complete investigation and a
thorough consideration of all pertinent data readily available to
him, is satisfied that the evidence shows the accused is guilty of the
crime to be charged.
b. There is legally sufficient, admissible evidence of a corpus
delicti.
c. There is legally sufficient, admissible evidence of the ac-
cused's identity as the perpetrator of the crime charged.
d. The prosecutor has considered the probability of convic-
tion by an objective fact-finder hearing the admissible evidence.
The admissible evidence should be of such convincing force that it
would warrant conviction of the crime charged by a reasonable
and objective fact-finder after hearing all the evidence available to
the prosecutor at the time of charging and after hearing the most
plausible, reasonably foreseeable defense that could be raised under
the evidence presented to the prosecutor.6
This standard reflects a respect for the power inherent in the ability
to accuse. D. Lowell Jensen, Deputy Attorney General of the United
States, and formerly the District Attorney for Alameda County, Califor-
5. See UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS, supra note 1; UNIFORM CRIME
CHARGING MANUAL, supra note 1; ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CALIFORNIA
PROSECUTOR, supra note 1.
6. UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 13; see also ETHICS AND
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nia,7 once told an audience of district attorneys, "You should always re-
member that as a group you have more direct power over the lives,
property and reputations of those in your jurisdiction than anyone else in
this nation... ."' Such authority carries great responsibility.9 While all
that is legally required to bring a charge is probable cause to believe in a
defendant's guilt,10 reliance on such a standard is misplaced. The prose-
cutor does no one a service when, entertaining a doubt himself, he
charges with the intent to "let the jury decide."
Like most ethical standards this one is both philosophically and
practically sound. From a philosophical perspective, charging a person
because he might be guilty simply is not good enough. Not only is the
potential for individual injustice intolerably great, but also charging
without confidence in the truth of the charge puts the entire system at
risk. Certainly citizens want to see the guilty held accountable. But they
also want to see responsibility rightfully laid at the feet of the culpable.
Justice is twice disserved if an innocent defendant is convicted. Not only
is the blameless blamed, but the blameworthy escapes.
The prosecutor also carries the burden of upholding the public faith.
He is empowered to make charging decisions, but it is his duty to make
them fairly.I If he fails to be fair, his failure affects not only himself and
the accused, but that level of public trust on which the system depends.
"Where the prosecutor is recreant to the public trust implicit in his office,
he undermines confidence, not only in his profession, but in government
and the very ideal of justice itself."12
In a democracy, the law must reflect the values of those who live
under it. Americans take great pride in our commitment to justice. Ac-
7. Mr. Jensen served as District Attorney for Alameda County from 1969-81.
8. Remarks by D. Lowell Jensen at the dedication of the Edward O'Neil Municipal
Court Branch of the Alameda County District Attorney's Office, Oakland California (October
28, 1983).
9. "Powers so great impose responsibilities correspondingly grave. They demand charac-
ter incorruptible, reputation unsullied, a high standard of professional ethics and sound judg-
ment of no mean order." Attorney General v. Tufts, 239 Mass. 458, 489, 132 N.E. 322, 326
(1921).
10. Probable cause has been defined as: "[A] state of facts as would lead a man of ordi-
nary caution or prudence to believe, and conscientiously entertain a strong suspicion of the
guilt of the accused." Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d 578, 582, 477 P.2d 131, 133, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 275, 277 (1970).
11. "As concerns the enforcement of the criminal law the office of the district attorney is
charged with grave responsibilities to the public. These responsibilities demand integrity, zeal
and conscientious effort .. " Taliaferro v. Locke, 182 Cal. App. 2d 752, 755-56, 6 Cal. Rptr.
813, 815 (1960).
12. NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 419 n.5 (citing A.B.A. CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, Canon 33, EC 7- 13 and Professional Responsibility: Re-
port of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1218 (1958)).
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cordingly, we use the law as a tool to assure a level of predictability,
fairness and safety in our lives. Yet any tool is only as good as the
workmen who use it. The prosecutor who works to obtain a conviction
without regard for the actual guilt of the accused abuses the law and
undercuts its very purpose. As one commentator put it: "The United
States is a nation of laws. If laws are to be obeyed they must be
respected; to be respected they must be just. A system which fails to be
equitable cannot survive." 13 The prosecutor must be satisfied that the
only just result is a conviction. He should never ask a jury to do some-
thing he himself would not do were he seated in their place.
From a practical standpoint, the dictate is equally sound. To invest
limited time and resources without a reasonably provable case is not
sound policy. Further, it runs the risk that while attention is misdi-
rected, the guilty will avoid responsibility. In commenting on this issue,
the Uniform Crime Charging Standards state:
These standards draw a distinction between mere probable cause to
arrest and legally sufficient evidence to convict.... The probable
cause standard for arrest is proper because it enables police to
make a proper investigation and, frequently, to alleviate a danger-
ous situation. While the prosecutor is legally justified in charging
on mere probable cause, he serves no useful, legitimate purpose in
so doing. 4
The obligation to critically evaluate a case is a continuing one.
Sometimes the strength of a case may change as the investigative and
trial preparation processes continue. New information may come to
light. Witnesses may provide additional or different information. If a
once solid case becomes less so, the prosecutor has a duty to reconsider
the matter. In commenting on the prosecutor's participation in plea bar-
gaining, for example, state ethical standards note:
Of course, if a prosecutor, after discussing a matter with defense
counsel who claims a client's innocence, entertains a valid, serious,
reasonable doubt as to guilt, and this doubt is not resolved by fur-
ther factual inquiry, the prosecutor should not engage in plea bar-
gaining. Dismissal of charges in a manner consistent with office
policy would be appropriate.15
There are many other specific areas in the criminal process which
depend on the prosecutor's sound ethics. These areas have been the sub-
13. President's Task Force on Victims of Crime, Final Report 16 (Washington, D.C.,
1982).
14. UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS, supra note 1, at 22.
15. ETHICS AND RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE CALIFORNIA PROSECUTOR, supra note 1, at
Snrinlz 1986"1 ON PROSECUTORIAL ETHICS
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ject of extensive commentary.' 6 In addition, many cases in every juris-
diction address the guidelines of prosecutorial conduct. Yet, in the final
analysis, the answers to any ethical question are found not in the cases,
but in our consciences. Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson stated
it somewhat differently, in language reflective of another era:
The qualities of a good prosecutor are as elusive and impossible to
define as those which mark a gentleman. And those who need to
be told would not understand it anyway. A sensitiveness to fair
play and sportsmanship is perhaps the best protection against the
abuse of power, and the citizen's safety lies in the prosecutor who
tempers zeal with human kindness, who seeks truth and not vic-
tims, who serves the law and not factional purposes, and who ap-
proaches his task with humility.17
Virtually all of prosecutorial ethics' 8 can be reduced to a single pre-
cept: "Prosecute only those you believe to be guilty and press that prose-
cution forcefully, according to the rules." A concise summary of those
rules is found in People v. Kelley:
As the representative of the government a public prosecutor is
not only obligated to fight earnestly and vigorously to convict the
guilty, but also to uphold the orderly administration of justice as a
servant and representative of the law. Hence, a prosecutor's duty
is more comprehensive than a simple obligation to press for convic-
tion. As the court said in Berger v. United States: "[The Prosecu-
tor] is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy,
but of a sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as
compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest,
therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case,
but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very
definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is
that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute
with earnestness and vigor- indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It
is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one....
Nevertheless, it is true that a public prosecutor, as representa-
tive of the People, must satisfy additional standards of conduct by
reason of his position as the officer who possesses the power and
16. See, e.g., ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN PROSECUTION (Nat'l College of District At-
torneys 1977).
17. "The Federal Prosecutor." Address by Justice Jackson, Second Annual Conference of
United States Attorneys, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 1940); published at 24 J. CRiM. L. 3
(1940).
18. Ethical standards also quite properly address ancillary issues including public ac-
countability, conflict of interest, and use of public office. For a further discussion of these and
other areas see UNIFORM CRIME CHARGING STANDARDS, supra note 1.
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authority to speak for the State. In practical effect the public pros-
ecutor functions in a dual capacity-as both agent and principal, as
both attorney and client. Because he exercises a dual function, the
prosecutor possesses additional responsibilities and becomes sub-
ject to broader duties than does defense counsel, who only exer-
cises the one function of agent-attorney. Thus a prosecutor is
required to meet standards of candor and impartiality not de-
manded of defense counsel. For example, a prosecutor must dis-
close unfavorable aspects of his case; defense counsel can remain
silent. A prosecutor must disclose unfavorable evidence relating to
the accusation and must make available impeaching evidence relat-
ing to witnesses. Defense counsel need not do either. A conviction
in a criminal cause may be reversed if the prosecutor suppresses
material evidence, makes improper comments during cross-exami-
nation, makes improper references to extrinsic matters, or fails to
disclose important information to the defense. Lapses by defense
counsel in these and other respects can never bring about reversal
of an acquittal. To this extent the Attorney General's complaint
about a double standard is correct, for "[t]he duty of the district
attorney is not merely that of an advocate."
Yet in numerous respects the situation of the prosecutor is
overwhelmingly advantageous when compared to that of defense
counsel. The prosecutor is not required to believe or disbelieve any
particular witness. Defense counsel is more or less bound to accept
his client's key assertions at face value. The prosecutor is not re-
quired to prosecute any particular defendant. Defense counsel,
and in particular public defenders, must defend persons entitled to
claim the benefit of their services. The prosecutor may modify
charges, abandon charges, or throw in his hand. Defense counsel,
by himself, can do none of these things. In short, the prosecutor
has tremendous freedom to rationally evaluate the merits of any
accusation he brings and to pursue it accordingly. But with greater
freedom comes greater responsibility. A prosecutor cannot keep
his dual functions wholly separate, and to some extent he always
remains the officer who acts for the State--even though in a given
instance he may be merely arguing in his capacity as counsel. Ac-
cordingly, imposition of a broader standard of conduct on the
prosecutor than on defense counsel is justified ... '9
If our nation of laws is to remain both strong and free, we must have
a system of criminal justice in which every citizen can have confidence.
The weight of maintaining this confidence falls on the shoulders of those
lawyers who walk into court to represent the People. It is, as it should
be, the highest calling of an American advocate.
19. 75 Cal. App. 3d 672, 680, 688-90, 142 Cal. Rptr. 457, 461-62, 466-70 (1977) (citations
omitted).
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